Introduction {#Sec1}
============

Explaining the evolution of durable, widespread cooperative behaviour in groups of self-interested individuals has been a challenge since the time of Darwin^[@CR1]--[@CR8]^. In response, researchers have turned to the critical role played by the underlying interaction networks, in which nodes represent individuals and links represent interactions^[@CR9],[@CR10]^. It has been shown that the nontrivial population structures represented by both homogeneous^[@CR2]--[@CR4],[@CR9],[@CR11]--[@CR13]^ and heterogeneous^[@CR10],[@CR14],[@CR15]^ networks permit the formation of stable clusters of cooperators (altruists), which achieve higher individual payoffs while also resisting exploitation from defectors (egoists). As such, both theoretical analysis^[@CR4],[@CR9],[@CR10],[@CR15]--[@CR20]^ and behavioural experiments^[@CR21]--[@CR28]^ point to network structure as a key ingredient for the emergence of cooperation.

However, these and other deep insights about the evolution of cooperation generally rely on a key assumption that the underlying interaction network (contact graph) of individuals is time-invariant (i.e., static). In practice, this assumption is often violated, especially in social networks, which tend to be formed from an ever-changing amalgam of short-lived interactions. For example, emails and text messages represent near-instantaneous and hence ephemeral links in the corresponding temporal network^[@CR29]^. Even in cases where interactions have non-negligible durations---such as phone calls, or the face-to-face interactions between inpatients in the same hospital ward---the network structure is in constant flux.

Recently, it has been shown that the temporality of edge activations can noticeably affect various dynamical processes, ranging from the information or epidemic spreading^[@CR30]--[@CR33]^ to network accessibility^[@CR34]^ to controllability^[@CR35]^. It is natural to expect that temporality will have a similarly profound effect in social systems, in which the relevant dynamical laws are strongly tied to the presence (or absence) of network links. There is a large body of work studying coevolutionary dynamics---in which the changes to the network structure are a direct result of the underlying dynamics (e.g., players strategically switching partners to shun defectors)^[@CR36]--[@CR41]^. Yet these mechanisms, though important, are just a few among many that influence the structure of real social networks, stressing the importance of studying temporality exogenous to the social dynamics. On this front, we mention one notable work that explored the impact of temporal social contacts on the evolution of cooperation, and claimed that the temporal dynamics of social ties favours selfish behaviour^[@CR42]^. And yet, given some profound advantages of temporal networks recently discovered in the context of dynamics and control^[@CR35]^, we are compelled to ask whether, under certain circumstances, temporality might actually enhance cooperation.

Here we study the evolution of cooperation on empirical and synthetic temporal networks first, and surprisingly, we find that temporal networks can facilitate the evolution of cooperation. We further investigate the impacts of bursty behaviour (namely, short timeframes of intense activity followed by long windows of relative silence)---a hallmark of many real social interaction patterns^[@CR43],[@CR44]^. We find that this facet of temporality is actually detrimental to the emergence of cooperation, instead facilitating the spread of egoists. Finally, we rationalise the previous findings by introducing a measure of temporality in networks, and show analytically that an intermediate level most favours cooperation. We confirm the generality of our results over different types of synthetic networks, varying interaction time scales, updating rules (both synchronous and asynchronous), and game dynamics.

Results {#Sec2}
=======

Modelling framework {#Sec3}
-------------------

We conduct our investigation in the setting of classic evolutionary game theory^[@CR9],[@CR11],[@CR14]^, in which two players interact by each choosing a strategy of cooperation (C) or defection (D). When their strategies agree, each player receives a payoff $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Figure [1](#Fig1){ref-type="fig"} illustrates the essence of our modelling framework. We consider the above game played out between pairs of adjacent nodes on a time-varying network, which we represent by a sequence of separate networks (snapshots) on the same set of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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To capture the interactions occurring on these networks, we initially set an equal probability for each individual (node) to choose C or D in the population on the first snapshot. In each round, every individual $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$f_{\mathrm{c}}$$\end{document}$) over another 2,000 rounds, similar to the canonical procedure used in static networks^[@CR14],[@CR15]^. Note that, in a departure from previous studies^[@CR36]--[@CR41]^, here the time-varying nature of the networks is completely exogenous, not being coupled to the game dynamics (by, for example, players changing whom they interact with to shun defectors). This allows us to independently study the effect of network temporality on the dynamics of the game.

Temporal networks facilitate the evolution of cooperation {#Sec4}
---------------------------------------------------------

Our principal result is that temporal networks generally enhance cooperation relative to their static counterparts. What's more, they allow it to persist at higher levels of temptation, $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$b$$\end{document}$. Figure [2](#Fig2){ref-type="fig"} shows the equilibrium fraction of cooperators $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$f_{\mathrm{c}}$$\end{document}$ for temporal networks formed from social contacts in four empirical datasets: attendees at a scientific conference (ACM conference)^[@CR47]^, students at a high school in Marseilles, France in two different years^[@CR48],[@CR49]^ (Student 2012, and Student 2013), and workers in an office building in France (Office 2013)^[@CR50]^. In each of these systems we observe a broad range of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$g$$\end{document}$ over which $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$f_{\mathrm{c}}$$\end{document}$ is greater in the temporal network than in its static counterpart, at almost all values of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$b$$\end{document}$. Strikingly, this is true even for small $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\Delta t$$\end{document}$; in this case the network's links are distributed over a large number of snapshots, leaving little network scaffolding on which to build stable clusters of cooperators. Nonetheless, there exists a range of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$g$$\end{document}$ that can compensate for this sparsity, again giving temporal networks the victory in terms of enhancing cooperation. Indeed, we find that the only scenario in which temporal networks result in less cooperation than static networks is when $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$g$$\end{document}$ is small. In this limit, the evolutionary timescale is comparable to the dynamical timescale, and patterns of cooperation have no time to stabilise before being disrupted by the next change in network structure. This squares our results with the previously-mentioned conclusion that temporality inhibits cooperation (Supplementary Fig. [1](#MOESM1){ref-type="media"}), which was obtained from the regime of a single game per snapshot ($\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$g = 1$$\end{document}$) with comparatively infrequent strategy updates^[@CR42]^. Interestingly, regardless of the value of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$g$$\end{document}$, our simulations show a rapid and on-average monotonic convergence of the cooperator fraction toward equilibrium (Supplementary Fig. [2](#MOESM1){ref-type="media"})---similar to the temporal profile previously found in co-evolving random networks^[@CR51]^.Fig. 2Temporal networks generally promote the evolution of cooperation in real social systems.For four empirical datasets: **a** the ACM conference, **b** Student 2012, **c** Student 2013, and **d** Office 2013, we show the frequency of cooperation ($\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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As there are many factors that might affect evolutionary outcomes^[@CR15],[@CR52],[@CR53]^, we have studied numerous alternative setups as well. These include: (i) using the original time scale of network edges (Supplementary Fig. [1](#MOESM1){ref-type="media"}), (ii) asynchronous updating of strategies (Supplementary Fig. [3](#MOESM1){ref-type="media"}), (iii) alternative social dilemmas like the canonical Stag-Hunt ($\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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To test whether this result depends on idiosyncrasies of the temporal patterns in real social systems, we have also simulated games on synthetic temporal versions of Erdős-Rényi (ER)^[@CR55]^ and scale-free (SF)^[@CR56]^ networks (see Methods). Here too we find that with almost any level of temporality, cooperators have an easier time gaining footholds in the population (Fig. [3](#Fig3){ref-type="fig"}). Interestingly, we find that temporal versions of SF networks yield a higher $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\langle k\rangle = 10$$\end{document}$. The robustness of the corresponding results for other parameters and other methods of generating synthetic temporal networks has been verified (see Supplementary Fig. [7](#MOESM1){ref-type="media"}).

Effects of burstiness on the evolution of cooperation {#Sec5}
-----------------------------------------------------

Analyses of the temporal patterns of human interactions in email^[@CR57]^, phone calls^[@CR57],[@CR58]^, and written correspondence^[@CR43]^ have revealed a high degree of burstiness---periods of intense activity punctuated by relative lulls---resulting in a heavy-tailed inter-event time distribution^[@CR43]^. Such temporal correlations in activity have been shown to have effects on network dynamics above and beyond those of temporality alone, for instance accelerating the spread of contagions^[@CR59],[@CR60]^. We have established that burstiness is present to varying degrees in each of the four datasets we study (Supplementary Fig. [10](#MOESM1){ref-type="media"}), prompting us to ask whether it helps or hinders the evolution of cooperation.

We address this question by shuffling each dataset, randomising the source, target, and timestamp of each social contact (see Methods). We stress that this randomisation has the effect of erasing bursty behaviour at the level of individual nodes. Figure [4](#Fig4){ref-type="fig"} shows that, in every temporal network we consider, cooperation is improved after randomisation, suggesting that bursty behaviour impedes the evolution of cooperation. Indeed, due to the heterogeneity of active times embedded in bursty behaviour of different players, it is harder for cooperators to form stable clusters to obtain benefits from mutual cooperation in order to compensate for the losses against defectors^[@CR9],[@CR25]^. For the effects of other null models that permute only the structure or the time stamps of the contacts, please refer to Supplementary Figs. [11](#MOESM1){ref-type="media"}--[14](#MOESM1){ref-type="media"}, where we also show that the above results are robust to alternative randomisation protocols. Furthermore, this is true for nearly all choices of parameters $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$b$$\end{document}$. But how do we reconcile the fact that burstiness is inimical to cooperation with our previous observation, namely that temporality generically promotes it?Fig. 4The intrinsic bursty behaviour in human interactions suppresses the maintenance of cooperation.For each dataset, we show the difference $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$1$$\end{document}$ with the corresponding curve in Fig. [2](#Fig2){ref-type="fig"} from **a**--**d**. We see that the frequency of cooperators generally increases after the bursty behaviour is destroyed, suggesting that correlations in activity within a social network are antagonistic toward the formation of cooperation. Note that for clarity of presentation, we did not plot the case for $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$g = 5000$$\end{document}$. However, all results for each dataset after randomisations with different null models^[@CR29]^ can be found in Supplementary Figs. [11](#MOESM1){ref-type="media"}--[14](#MOESM1){ref-type="media"}. Other parameters are the same as those in Fig. [2](#Fig2){ref-type="fig"}.

Cooperation is maximised at intermediate temporality {#Sec6}
----------------------------------------------------

The burstiness and the parameters $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\Delta t$$\end{document}$ on the other hand indicates the extent to which the network structure is spread over time; finally, the burstiness represents time correlations in the network structure. To understand the effects of these parameters in a unified way, we define the following measure of the temporality $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$0$$\end{document}$ for any two nearby empty networks without links. This measure captures the tendency of a randomly-chosen link to change status (either active to inactive, or vice versa) in the next snapshot. By construction, we always have $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Figure [5](#Fig5){ref-type="fig"} shows the values of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$${\cal{T}}$$\end{document}$ for both the original and randomised versions of each of the four datasets we study. We see that at $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\Delta t = 1$$\end{document}$, the original data tend to display high temporality, which decreases upon randomisation, suggesting that most interactions (links) in these systems last less than $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$f_{\mathrm{c}}$$\end{document}$ increases after randomisation (Fig. [4](#Fig4){ref-type="fig"}), this suggests that too-high temporality hinders the spread of cooperation, instead fostering egoistic behaviour. On the other hand, we find that a too-low value for $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$${\cal{T}}$$\end{document}$ is also associated with diminished cooperation (Supplementary Fig. [16](#MOESM1){ref-type="media"}). Altogether, the picture that emerges is one of an intermediate regime---a sweet spot of temporality at which cooperation is maximally enhanced relative to static systems.Fig. 5The temporality of real networks.The temporality $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Theoretical analysis {#Sec7}
--------------------

Having demonstrated that an intermediate level of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\Delta t$$\end{document}$ facilitates cooperation most, we are prompted to theoretically explain this observation. We model temporal networks theoretically using the activity-driven model^[@CR33]^. Here, a node can either be active---in which case it forms links with an average $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$D_a^m$$\end{document}$ denote the expected number of those that are defectors. Also, we will denote by $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\lambda$$\end{document}$) the average probability for a defector (cooperator) to become a cooperator (defector) in the next round.

Staring from a specific snapshot $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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When we take the continuum limit with respect to the time $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\Delta t$$\end{document}$ is the total time the corresponding dataset covers (see Supplementary Table [1](#MOESM1){ref-type="media"}).

We can understand the link between the model predictions and the data by rewriting the threshold (3) as $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Discussion {#Sec8}
==========

We have shown that temporal networks, both empirical and synthetic, generically enhance the emergence of cooperation relative to their static counterparts. Remarkably, this central finding holds even after the underlying contact sequences are randomised, thereby destroying topological (e.g. clustering) or temporal (e.g. bursts) correlations in the data. Altogether, this suggests that temporality---and temporality alone---is sufficient to improve cooperation. Indeed, after randomisations, we find that the level of cooperation is actually improved, demonstrating that the bursty nature of human interactions hinders the maintenance of cooperation to some degree. Finally, we demonstrate that the temporality of a network determines the fate of cooperators, with cooperators flourishing at intermediate values of network temporality.

The temporal networks considered here should be contrasted with coevolutionary dynamics, in which the changes in network structure are tied to the dynamics of the relevant social dilemmas. For example, several important mechanisms elucidate that cooperation can be boosted by strategic migration^[@CR36],[@CR40]^, and deliberate switching of interaction partners to avoid defectors^[@CR37],[@CR61],[@CR62]^. However, it is unlikely the temporality characterising real social interactions is driven exclusively (or even primarily) by strategic switching in pursuit of a given objective^[@CR47]--[@CR50]^. This underscores the importance of studying cases in which the temporality is exogenous to the game dynamics, allowing an independent assessment of how the former affects the latter. As such, the agnostic view of the nature of temporality we have taken here represents a fundamental strength of our approach.

We have shown that our main conclusions are not artifacts of the specific empirical networks considered here, nor do they qualitatively change under different parameterisations. Nonetheless, future investigations such as appropriate behavioural experiments that incorporate network temporality and relevant phenomena like burstiness are warranted. Though we have shown that our results are unchanged when considering only subsets of the network (Supplementary Fig. [18](#MOESM1){ref-type="media"}), disregarding very short-lived contacts (Supplementary Fig. [19](#MOESM1){ref-type="media"}), changing the clustering coefficient (Supplementary Figs. [20](#MOESM1){ref-type="media"} and [21](#MOESM1){ref-type="media"}), or using different starting network types (Supplementary Fig. [22](#MOESM1){ref-type="media"}), real systems display considerable variability, including different characteristic timescales for population evolution (Supplementary Fig. [23](#MOESM1){ref-type="media"}). Accordingly, future analysis of interactions at different spatial and temporal scales will be necessary to understand the full implications of temporality. Toward this end, the long tradition of combining tools from network science and statistical physics^[@CR63]^ with evolutionary game theory will no doubt continue to pay dividends.

Another natural extension of the current work is to consider group interactions, which involve the interactions among individuals who are not directly connected with one another^[@CR64]--[@CR66]^. These interactions generate much more dynamical complexity than pairwise interactions alone^[@CR67]^. In microbial populations, for example, pairwise outcomes can predict the survival of three-species competitions with accuracy as high as 90%, yet information on the outcomes of three-species competition is still needed in order to predict scenarios over larger numbers of species with high accuracy^[@CR68]^. Moreover, the menu of strategies can be expanded beyond the simple dichotomy of cooperation versus defection, which represents only one axis of a broader landscape of moral behaviour^[@CR69]^. For example, three-strategy games analogous to rock-paper-scissors may present a more nuanced picture of the detailed interactions characterising microbial communities, ecosystems, and human societies alike.

Methods {#Sec9}
=======

Empirical temporal networks and datasets {#Sec10}
----------------------------------------

We construct temporal networks from empirical datasets collected by the SocioPatterns collaboration (<http://www.sociopatterns.org>) by aggregating contacts into undirected network links over time windows of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$${\Bbb T}$$\end{document}$ is the last timestamp in the data, resulting in a single snapshot containing all links.

Synthetic temporal networks {#Sec11}
---------------------------

We generate temporal analogues of networks with heterogeneous or homogeneous degree distributions with specified network size $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$p$$\end{document}$ of edges to be active in each one. We have verified that our results hold under more sophisticated generative models that build temporal networks from a static network backbone, such as the activity-driven model^[@CR33]^.

Randomisations of empirical datasets {#Sec12}
------------------------------------

We consider four widely-used null models^[@CR29]^ to randomise the empirical datasets: Randomised Edges (RE) where we randomly choose pairs of edges $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$(i^{\prime},j^{\prime})$$\end{document}$, and replace them with $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$(i,i^{\prime})$$\end{document}$ and $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$(j,j^{\prime})$$\end{document}$ or $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$(i,j^{\prime})$$\end{document}$ and $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$(j,i^{\prime})$$\end{document}$ with equal probability provided this results in no self loops; Randomly Permuted Times (RPT), where we shuffle the timestamps of the contacts, leaving their sources and targets unaltered; Randomly Permuted Times + Randomised Edges (RPTRE) which consists first of RPT followed by RE; and Time Reversal (TR), where the temporal order of the contacts is reversed.
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